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l. The concept ofstrong necessity
A strongly necessitates B, when it is not possible that A
and not B, though it is conceivable that A and not B. In
another Íormu|ation: A entai|s B' but it is not a priori fuhat A
entails B (A does not imply B). Strong metaphysicat ne-
cessities determine the space oÍ possib|e wor|ds. |f the
space of possible worlds is sparser then the worlds which
are (ideally primarily positively) conceivable, then whether
a world is possible or not, is determined by some meta-
physical fact, over and above the world's being (ideally
primarily positively) conceivable.' Thus: accepting that
there are strong necessities commits one to modal empir-
icsm; denying it, to modal rational ism.
The concept oÍ strong necessity may be i||uminated
further by considering the relation between complete de-
scription of a world w and a particular true statement S. lf,
given the complete qualitative description of world w, S is
true in word w considered as actual (viz. S is true. inter-
preted according to its primary intension), but S is not en-
tai|ed a priori by the comp|ete qua|itative description oÍ w,
then the facts described by the complete qualitative de-
scription of world w strongly determine the facts S de-
scribes.
Whether strong metaphysical necessities exist, also
have implications for the consciousness-brain relation, in
the following way. Chalmers argues that the possibility of
zombies is sufiicient to refute materialism. Now, zombies
seems conceivable (or, at least, I will not challenge this
assumption here), but are they also possible? According to
modal rationalism the conceivability of zombies implies
their possibility, according to modal empiricism, it does not.
Hence, one way of rejecting the zombie argument is to
r I use David Chalmers'conceptual apparatus here.
Negatíve conceivabl/Íy oÍ a statemént s: s is not ru|ed out by our concepts.
For examp|e, is negative|y conceÍVab|e that bats have bat-experiences, radi-
ca|ly diÍferent Írom human experiences, for the concepts describing the u|tra-
sound mechanisms of bat perceotion do not rule this out.
Positive @nceívabilv of a statement s: a positive conception can be formed
in which S is the case, (we have the relevant notions for conceiving it). For
example, zombies are positively conceivable: we have the notions to conceive
a being Who is an exact physica| dup|icate oÍ a norma| human being, but has
no Dhenomenal consciousness.
ldeal conceivabílity is conceivabi|ity by an idea| reasoner (an idea||y rationa|
being).
Metaphysical possÍbility. What God might have created, had He so chosen
(metaphorically put). For example, God could have created a mile-high unicy-
cle, but he couldn't have created a male vixen.
Prímary intensÍon. A function rendering extensions to possib|e wor|ds consid-
ered as actual. When "considering a world w as actual", we determine the
extension of our terms at Wor|d W as Ío||ows. We take the reÍerence-fixer oí the
terms in world w, and determine what they would pick out in world w, were w
the actual world.
Secondary intension' A Íunction rendering extensions to possib|e Worlds
considered as counterfactual. When "considering a world w as counterfactual",
we take the reference-fixer of the terms in the actual world, detemine what
they picks out in the actual woÍ|d, and render these reÍerences to world W'
A statement S is primarily conceivable (1-Con\, if it is conceivable when inter-
preted according to iis primary intension' A statement s is /deaily posítively
pimarily conceivable, iÍ s is positive|y conceivab|e by an idea| reasoner'
interpreted according to its primary intension' A statement itis pimaÍíly possi-
b/e (1.Pos) if it is possib|e (there is a possible Woí|d in Wtrich it is hué), When jt
is interpreted according to its pÍimary intension. A statement s is sécondaí'
poss/b/e (2-Pos), if it is possible, interpreted according to its secondary inten-
s ion .
There is one sing|e space oÍ metaphysica||y possib|e Wor|ds,' )': entai|S á pnbi.
(See e.g. Chalmers 1996. chap. 2.)
hold that zombies are not possible, even thought they are
conceivab|e; víz. certain physica| (brain) events strong|y
necessitate conscious events. This view is a version of a
posteriori materialism, which holds that physical facts de-
termine facts about consciousness. but thev do not deter-
mine them a priori.
ll. Chalmers' arguments against strong necessities
One argument of David Chalmers against strong meta-
physical necessities is the following. There are no candi-
dates of strong necessities, except - the alleged - strong
necessity of the brain-consciousness relation; and this
suggests that strong necessity is an ad froc invention to
save materialism. I shall argue, however, that it follows
trom Chalmers, views on the semantics and ontology oÍ
microphysica| terms, that there are some oÍher strong ne-
cessities: microphysical identifications, such as,,Hydrogen
is the such and such quantumstate" are strongly neces-
sary. (|f I am right, it a|so Ío||ows that a posteriori materia|.
ism cannot be rejected on the general assumption that
there are no strong metaphysical necessities whatsoever.
However, my argument clearly does not establish the truth
of a posteriori maierialism, I do not have this aim here.)
Chalmers modal rationalist claim that there are no
strong necessities whatsoever, is elaborated in terms of
the following principles (Chalmers 2002, 174-188):
(CP+) ldeal posit ive 1-Con P ) 1-Pos P
(CP-) ldeal negative 1-Con P ) 1-Pos P
(CP+) and (CP-) do not have the same strength of eviden-
tial support; (CP+) is almost certainly true, according to
Chalmers, while (CP-) is not. This is not relevant to my
argument, however, for I shall deal primarily with (CP+).
l l l .  My thesis: microphysical identif ications are
strongly necessary
My thesis is that there are counterexamples to (CP+); they
are ideally positively primarily conceivable, but not primar-
ily possible. I suggest that microphysical identifycation are
such cases: they should count as strongly necessary, if we
adopt Chalmers' semantics and metaphysics of micro-
physical terms.
My example is the claim that "Hydrogen is QM". The
terms "hydrogen" and "QM" should be understood as fol-
Iows. The reÍerence-fixer of ..hydrogen', is ..hydrogen-
likeness", viz. having a certain emission spectrum, SpE;
QM is a certain quantum-mechanical state, which is de-
scribed by the Schrödinger-equation, the eigen-va|ues of
which are the energy levels corresponding to the spectrum
SpE. In our world, what is hydrogen-l ike is QM.
Now consider the following argument.
(1) "Hydrogen is not QM" is ideal ly primari ly posit ively
conceivable.
(2) lf "Hydrogen is not QM" is ideally primarily positively
conceivable, then "Hydrogen is not QM" is primarily pos-
sible.
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(3) lf 'lHydrogen is not QM" is primarily possible, then
"Hydrogen is not QM" is secondarily possible.
"Hydrogen is not QM" is secondarily possible.
But the conclusion must be false. For if "Hydrogen is QM"
is true in our world, then it is secondarily necessarily true
that "Hydrogen is QM" (by the definition of the secondary
intension of "Hydrogen is QM"), hence it cannot be the
case that it is secondarily possible that "Hydrogen is QM".
Hence, we have to reject one of the premises.
The support Íor the premises
As regards (í)
(1) is true' because it is noÍ a priori that,,Hydrogen is QM'.
For all we can know a priori (in principle), do hot rule out
that "Hydrogen is not QM". After all, "Hydrogen is QM" is
an empirical truth. And we can also conceive of a scenario
in which "Hydrogen is not QM" (namely a scenario, in
which "Hydrogen is QM-", QM- being a microphysical state
other than QM). Hence it is both negatively and positively
conceivable that "Hydrogen is not QM".
Note that there is another conception of conceiv-
ability which sometimes gets mixed up with the one we
used here, namely: ,,it accords with our present know-
|edge''. |Í ..Hydrogen is not QM,, were on|y conceivab|e in
this sense, this would not ground that "Hydrogen is QM" is
strongly necessary. However, "Hydrogen is not QM" is
conceivable in the relevant sense. To see this, consider
the following example. The Goldbach-conjecture (any even
integer is the product oÍ two primes) and a|so its negation
is conceivable, in the sense that they both accord with our
present knowledge. But they both cannot accord with all
what we can know a pioi in principle. For if the Goldbach-
conjecture is true, it is a priori true. Hence it is ruled out a
priori lhat it is false; and we cannot form a scenario in
which it is false, either. (We can know that the Goldbach-
conjecture is true (or false) a priori in principle, for we can
have an a prioi prooÍ for it - even if haven't got it as yet).
Thus, if the Goldbach-conjecture is true, then it is both
negatively and posivitely inconceivable that it is false, in
our sense of conceivability. But the case of "Hydrogen is
QM" is different. "Hydrogen is QM" is true, but not a prioi
true. So, unlike in the case of the Goldbach-conjecture,
even if we know that "Hydrogen is QM" is true, we can
conceive, in the relevant sense, that it is false.
As regards (2)
(2) is an application of the general (CP+) principle to a
particu|ar case. So iÍ we accept (cP+)' Víz' modal ration.
alism, we have to accept (2) as well.
As regards (3)
(3) follows from Chalmers' semantics of microphysical
terms. Accordingly
(i) "Hydrogen" has the same reference-fixer in all pos-
sible worlds.
(ii) The reference-fixer picks out the same entity, namely
QM, at all possible worlds.
Hence,
The primary intension of ,,hydrogen" is a constant func-
t ion.
Since the secondary intension of "hydrogen" is the same
as its the primary intension (it also renders QM to each
possible world), therefore (3) holds: if it is primarily pos-
sible that "Hydrogen is not QM", then it is also secondarily
possible.
Now, iÍ we cannot reject (1) and (3)' then the on|y
option remaining is to reject (2). Rejecting (2) amounts to
rejecting (CP+)' víz. modal rationa|ism, for it is tantamount
to the claim that while it is conceivable that "Hydrogen is
not QM", it is not possible. This means, that "H is QM is
strongly necessary: hence we have a case of strong ne-
cessity different from the brain-consciousness relation
Objections
We may investigate further whether the support for (3) is
really acceptable.
(i) expresses the so-called "semantic account of
considering a possible world as actual". Against such an
interpretation Robert Stalnaker has formulated objections
(Stalnaker 200'1).
As against (ii), there are several argumentative
strategies. one |ine is to c|aim, that (a) the semantics oÍ
,,H" is similar to the semantics of ,,wate/', in the sense that
its primary reference may change across worlds (As ,,wa-
tef' may refer to XYZ, ,,H" may refer to QM* at some non-
actual worlds considered as actual). I shall come back to
this later.
Another line against (ii) is to claim (b) that ,,H" does
not refer to some categorical property, but to some disposi-
tional, structural property, and this allows that ,,H" does not
denote QM, but something else in some (non-actual)
worlds considered as actual. According to the now domi-
nant view, the properties microphysical theories attribute to
microphysical entities are categorical properties, playing
both a reference-fixing role and being essential properties
of these entities (e.9. the reference-fixer of ,,electron" is the
,,electron-role", and the properties constituting the electron-
role are the same properties which are the categorical
properties of electrons, according to microphysical theo-
ries). But there are views to the contrary: Schlick's, Rus-
sell's, or Maxwell's structuralist materialism, or Chalmers'
F-monism assert that properties appearing in the refer-
ence-fixing descriptions of microphysical terms are disposi-
tional/structural properties, which are not identical with the
essential properties of the referents of the microphysical
terms.
There are well-known arguments against such a
structuralist account. Just to mention one: in other cases,
where the reference-Íixing properties are not the essentia|
properties of the referent, there are some plausible candi-
date of knowable nature for the role of the essential prop-
erties. (E.9. the essential property of what ,,water" refers to,
is its microphysical property of being HzO, its reference-
fixing property is being watery.). However, on the struc-
turalist account of the meaning of microphysical terms,
there are no such candidates, the nature oÍ the posited
essential properties are in principle unknowable; and this
seems counterintuitive.
Now, coming back to (a), the ,,H"and ,,wate/' com-
parision. One may hold that (3) is false; the inference does
not hold, for 1-Pos(hydrogen is not QM) is true, but 2-
Pos(hydrogen is not QM) is false. There is an apparently
similar case, water's not being HzO: it ls l-Pos(Water is
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not H2O), butit is not 2-Pos(Water is not H2O). The reason
is that the reference-fixer of "water", watery stuff, may pick
out diÍferent substances at some possible wor|ds (e.g.
XYZ); hence 1-Pos(Water is not H2O). But the secondary
intension of "water'' renders H2O to all possible worlds (if
our world is the actual world), hence it is not 2-Pos(Water
is not H2O).
However, the case of "Hydrogen is not QM" is differ-
ent. For the primary intension of "hydrogen" r's a constant
function, it renders QM to each possible world considered
as actual. And the secondary intension of "hydrogen" is
a|so (the same) constant function, by deÍinition. Hence if it
is 1-Pos(H is not QM), then it is 2-Pos(H is not QM); there
is no analogy with the case of water's not being H2O.
We may still hold, the above answer notwithstand-
ing, that the semantics of "H" is analogous with the seman-
tics of "wate/'. For the metaphysical intuition behind the
semantic idea that "H" refers to QM in all possible worlds
considered as actuaí, is that hydrogen is a fundamenta|
entity of the world: and hence, in worlds where it exists, it
must have the same nature as in our world. However, the
objection goes' hydrogen is noÍ at the most basic onto|ogi-
cal level, and the metaphysical-cum,semantic intuit ion
concerned applies only to terms denoting the most funda-
mental entities. (We assume, for the sake of argument,
that such a hierarchical ontological model of physical enti-
ties is conect.)
To this We can rep|y the Ío||owing. First of a||,
Chalmers' account of the water is H2O case clearly sup-
ports my interpretation oÍ his semantics Íor ,'H'', since ne
holds that "H2O" refers to the same entity in all possible
worlds considered as actual; hence the same should apply
to "H" (H and H2O being on the same ontological evel).
Second, even if we accept this objection, a similar argu-
ment may be run not with hydrogen, but with some orner
entity, which is assumed to be at the most fundamental
ontological level, for example with quarks. A parallel iden-
tity claim may be for example "c-quark is C-eRK" (where
"C-QRK' denotes the essential properties of c-quarks.)
Then this identification would count as strongly necessary.
Conclusion
lf we accept Chalmers' semantics and metaphysics con-
cerning microphysical terms, it follows that microphysical
identifications are strongly necessary. Hence, within
Chalmers' metaphysical and semantic framework there
must be some strongly necessary relations, besides the -
alleged - strong necessity of the brain-consciousness rela-
t ion. This result supports modal empiricism. lt also counts
in favour oÍ a posteriori materialism, for it b|ocks the objec-
tion that a posterioi materialism is committed to there
being strong necessities, but there are no such modalities
at al l .
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